This paper investigates whether intangibles might explain the UK productivity slowdown in a way that looks like labour hoarding. We note that since the recession: (a) firms have upskilled faster than before; (b) intangible investment in R&D and software has risen whereas tangible investment has fallen; and (c) intangible investment and telecoms equipment investment slowed in advance of the recession. We have therefore tested to see if: (a) what looks like labour hoarding is actually firms keeping workers who are employed in creating intangible assets; (b) how much the current slowdown in TFP growth is due to the spillover effects of the past slowdown in R&D and telecoms equipment investment. Our main findings are: (a) measured market sector real value added growth since the start of 2011, at 1.3%, is understated by 1.1% (about 0.5%pa); (b) TFP growth would have slowed down anyway by around 0.75pppa. In terms of the labour productivity puzzle then, true value added is growing faster than measured, 2.4% rather then 1.3%, and since hours growth has been 2.3% over this period, productivity has not been -1% but +0.1%. We believe that unmeasured intangibles are part of the explanation, but not all of it.
Introduction
Between 2007 and 2009 UK market sector value added fell by 5.8%. Hours worked fell by 1.9%% and hence productivity fell by 3.9%
1 . In 2009, hours started to grow again, but output has grown very slowly. Between 2011 and 2012Q3, the latest period for which market sector data are available, hours have grown by 2.3% but market sector value added by 1.3%. Hence productivity has fallen by 1%..
Why?
The standard explanation for the initial fall in productivity is labour hoarding. In most previous recessions, firms cut output but keep labour in reserve for the recovery. Productivity, output per worker, falls at first, but then recovers as the firm uses the reserve inputs. Strictly speaking the fall in productivity is mismeasurement since the output per utilised input is the same, but with utilisation typically poorly measured this shows up as a fall, then rise, in productivity.
This explanation seems to carry less and less weight for the post 2008 years, for it seems very unlikely that firms are still carrying underutilised workers four years on. Further, as we document below, during the recession and since, firms have upskilled at much faster pace (skill-adjusted labour composition rose at 0.5%pa 2001-08, but at 1.1% after 2008 2 ). Thus if firms are holding onto workers, it is the high skilled, not the low skilled.
In this paper we thus examine the role of intangibles. Our starting point is the observation that whilst investment in tangibles, plant/vehicles/buildings has fallen and stayed low, a point perhaps not noticed is that investment in intangibles, specifically R&D and software has risen since the recession (software fell and has then been rising, R&D was flat and then rose). Consider then a firm who has reduced production but maintained investment in intangibles. Its skill level rises, since intangible investment typically requires high qualified workers. Its measured output falls, since the output of e.g. R&D projects might not manifest itself for a few years. Thus labour productivity falls, in a pattern that looks just like labour hoarding.
There is a second effect. Although intangible investment has been relatively robust over the recession, it fell before 2008. This was because there was a huge surge in intangible investment in the late 1990s around the introduction of the internet, with new software, machinery etc. In addition, as is well known, R&D investment as a share of GDP has been falling for quite some time in the UK. If such investment has spillovers, and they take some time, then it might be that productivity/TFP fell before the recession anyway, due to the slowdown in intangible investment in the early 2000s.
3 This paper then reviews these hypotheses. It therefore attempts to add an additional hypothesis to that literature on the UK productivity puzzle. There is a wide range of commentary and articles written on the productivity puzzle and offering a number of different explanations 3 . For example, the productivity puzzle has been discussed in various speeches by MPC members including Dale (2011 ), Broadbent (2012 and Weale (2012) and by other commentators such as Martin and Rowthorn (2012) .
See also Hughes and Saleheen (2012) for the UK productivity puzzle in an historical and international perspective. See ONS (2012a, 2012b) for a measurement perspective on the productivity puzzle and ONS (2013) for a microdata perspective.
Our main conclusions are as follows. First, measured market sector real value added growth since the start of 2011, at 1.3%, is understated by 1.1% (about 0.5%pa). In terms of the labour productivity puzzle then, true value added is growing faster than measured, 2.4% rather then 1.3%, and since hours growth has been 2.3% over this period, productivity has not been -1% but +0.1%. Second, TFP growth would have slowed down anyway by around 0.75pppa. The actual slowdown is much larger than this, since DlnTFP has gone from a pre-recession average of 1.39%pa (2002-7) to -2.29%pa
(2007-10), so we explain around (0.75/3.68=)20% of it. Thus we believe that unmeasured intangibles are part of the explanation of the productivity puzzle, but not all of it.
II. Productivity, TFP growth and investment
IIa. Some facts Figure 1 shows the UK productivity puzzle. As the figure shows, GDP per hour fell very sharply in 2008, but then recovered somewhat in the quarters afterward. It has been falling since mid-2010. As the graph shows, output per hour is around 15 per cent below its pre-crisis trend. Mechanically, there has been weak output growth combined with a much more robust labour market than most people expected. Hours have not fallen by as much as previous falls in output would predict. 
IIb. Capital/labour substitution and labour hoarding
Columns 2 and 3 show the contributions to labour productivity growth of growth in capital per hour and labour quality per hour. Both columns shed light on two hypotheses concerning the labour market. One is that the decline in real wages has lowered the relative price of labour to capital thus incentivising substitution away from capital towards labour. At the same time, tightening of credit conditions since the financial crisis might have further increased the relative price of capital.
The data here give some slight support for this view. As column 3 shows, the contribution of K/H up to the recession was 1% pa. In 2009, that contribution rose strongly, that is, labour was reduced more than capital. In 2010 by contrast, the contribution fell quite markedly, suggesting that firms are, 
ΔlnTFP (without intangibles, market sector)
7 relative to before, substituting towards labour. This pattern is reflected in columns 4, 5, and 6 which show TFP growth. As we set out below, TFP growth measures labour productivity growth controlling for capital/labour inputs. TFP growth declined very sharply in the recession, suggesting that labour productivity did not just fall due to capital/labour substitution.
A second view is labour hoarding. Rowthorn and Martin (2012) advance the view that the fall in labour productivity is due to labour hiring behaviour. Consider a firm with "overhead" and "variable"
labour. An initial fall in demand causes overhead labour to be hoarded and variable to be fired, though these effects are moderated with a fall in real wages. Productivity falls as overhead labour is under-utilised. A recovery in demand, at low wages, causes variable labour to be hired. Productivity rises as overhead labour utilisation recovers, but might fall as more labour is hired. To get an overall fall in productivity and then no rise in the employment recovery, they posit high and low productivity sectors. In the initial recession the high productivity sector fired variable labour and kept on overhead labour at low utilisation. In the recovery, that sector hired few new workers and raised utilisation: a jobless recovery with rising productivity in that sector. The low productivity sector by contrast fired both types, so that in the recovery they hired both types, lowering overall productivity via a mix effect. They present evidence that the recovery in employment since 2008 has been entirely in the low productivity sector (see their  Chart  14  and  table  12, http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/BM_Report3.pdf). (their high productivity sectors are manufacturing, financial and business services, low productivity are agriculture, construction, distribution, hotels and restaurants).
One way to look at the Martin/Rowthorn hypothesis is via labour composition indices. These are indices of labour hours adjusted for various dimensions of labour composition (e.g. skill, age, gender).
In practice they are driven by skill levels so that if the index of labour composition rises (DlnL/H), then firms are increasingly hiring more skilled workers per hour worked. ONS data for the contribution of quality-adjusted labour services per hour worked is presented in Column 2 of Table 1 .
If low-skilled labour had been hoarded, we would expect the contribution of labour composition to either grow less fast or even decline. But growth in the contribution of labour composition in 2009 and 2010 has been extremely strong, suggesting the opposite has occurred. That is that firms have hoarded high-skilled labour at the expense of low-skilled. This is borne out in the analysis contained in Acheson (2011) and Acheson and Franklin (2012) . Note that this is also consistent with the data for R&D investment in Figure 1 , and other categories of intangible investment, all consistent with the idea that it is the higher skilled "knowledge workers" that have been kept on by firms.
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However, the Rowthorn/Martin view is across different sectors. In the recession, they argue, the high productivity sectors have hoarded relatively more skilled labour and let go relatively more unskilled.
Thus they should have a relatively large rise in labour composition. In the recovery, the high productivity sector employs more fully their hoarded skilled workers and takes on relatively few unskilled. The low productivity sectors, take on relatively more low skilled labour. So again, the high productivity sector should have a relatively high rise in composition. The data from Acheson and Franklin (2012) do not support this version of the Rowthorn/Martin view. In the initial recession DlnL/H rose by 1.6%pa and 2.5%pa in the high and low productivity sectors and in the recovery by 1.9% and 2.0%. Thus, in the recession, the low productivity sectors retained relatively more skilled than the high productivity and in the recovery have hired relatively more skilled than the high productivity sectors 4 . The data used to make this comparison are presented in an Appendix (Table   A1 ).
IIb. Direct evidence on utilisation.
Direct evidence is very hard to come by on utilisation since it is so hard to observe. Basu et al (2006) suggest a theory to measure it essentially by actual hours per worker per year (H/N) 5 . To do this, they In contrast to results in the US, as in Basu et al (2006) , it turns out that in the UK data is relatively small at 0.39 (compared to  >1 in the US data) due to relatively small changes in utilisation with the economic cycle. Therefore the adjustment to TFP is small, as shown in the following chart. 
was -1.6%. Our UK estimate for  is 0.39. The contribution of utilisation in 2009 is therefore (0.39*-0.016=)-0.6%, thus adding 0.6% to TFP. Note that if the UK estimate of  were more similar 6 Note that utilisation is partly controlled for in the shares following the Berndt-Fuss-Hulten theorem. A new building for example raises lnK. But if is it unoccupied, then its rent income is zero, hence s K Q =0 and so it has no impact on lnQ. Thus insofar as utilisation is reflected in prices, the income share controls for underutilisation. Berndt-Fuss-Hulten point out that when the operating surplus is calculated residually asset compensation reflects the actual marginal product of capital, in this case zero, thus partly accounting for utilisation in the estimation of TFP. 
III. The relation between productivity, TFP growth and investment
To explain these data let us set out a slightly more formal model. Consider the following framework. Let output Q be a function of the services of labour. L, , tangible. K, and intangible capital, R, with a shift term A. Then we can write GDP in terms of a production function and in terms of nominal expenditure as (1) ( , , )
Where I and N are the real values of tangible and intangible investment. V is the sum of consumption and tangible investment and will appear below. This means we can write the relation between measured output growth, lnV and true output growth, lnQ, which is
, ln ln ( ln ln )
We are now in a position to review the possible biases due to omitted intangibles. First, if in the recovery DlnN>DlnV, for which we have seen some evidence in Figure 3, So, for example, in 2011, real output growth should be 0.55% higher than it is measured. Recession highlighted by blue column.
The chart shows that in the late 1990s, when there was an intangible investment boom, the term is positive, that is value-added including intangibles was growing faster than measured value-added. In The impact of this in terms of labour productivity can be seen in Figure 6 . There the red line is an index of labour productivity as conventionally measured, and the green line an index of labour productivity with the underlying output measure adjusted to treat intangible spending as capital investment. As can be seen, by 2012, not accounting for intangibles results in the index of labour productivity being underestimated by around 1 index point 9 . The reason is that measured output growth since the start of 2011, DlnV, is 1.3%. Adjusted growth, DlnQ is 2.4%. Growth in hours worked is 2.3%. Therefore using the measured data underestimates growth in labour productivity by 1.1% (about 0.5% per annum).
Spillovers
Intangible investment affects the productivity growth of the firm undertaking the investment. But it has an additional effect if there are spillovers. There is a large body of work suggesting that R&D has 9 Taking the self-employed out of the headline measure of productivity also accounts for about 1 per cent of the productivity puzzle. A number of US authors have noted a slowdown in US MFP growth before the 2008 recession, which they ascribe in turn to a slowdown in intangible investment in the early 2000s following the heavy burst of intangible investment in the late 1990s internet/computer boom. In the UK, there has also been a sustained slowdown in UK R&D/GDP spend noted by a number of authors and policy-makers.
We thus examine the data for the UK: was there an intangible investment slowdown and might that have slowed down underlying MFP growth before the recession? How big might these effects be? Table 2 
Conclusion
We have investigated whether intangibles might explain the UK productivity slowdown. We have noted that since the recession (a) firms have held onto their more skilled workers and decreased their unskilled workers at an increasing rate (b) intangible investment in R&D and software has risen whereas tangible investment has fallen.
(c) intangible investment and telecoms equipment slowed in advance of the recession
We have therefore tested to see if a. What looks like labour hoarding is actually firms retaining workers who are employed in creating intangible assets (e.g. R&D teams); whose current output is therefore zero and whose contribution to total investment is unmeasured since intangibles are treated as expenses not investment b. How much the slowdown in current DlnTFP is due to the spillover effects of the slowdown in R&D and telecoms equipment investment in the past.
Our main findings are a. First, measured market sector real value added growth since the start of 2011, at 1.3%, is understated by 1.1% (about 0.5%pa). In terms of the labour productivity puzzle then, true value added is growing faster than measured, 2.4% rather then 1.3%, and since hours growth has been 2.3% over this period, productivity has not been -1% but +0.1%.
b. TFP growth would have slowed down anyway by around 0.75pppa. In fact, the actual slowdown is much larger than this, since DlnTFP has gone from a pre-recession average Does that mean the UK still has an output gap? If potential output growth is determined by TFP growth, as it is in many models, our spillover results suggest that potential output growth has fallen.
But potential output growth is not a given, since intangible investment may be amenable to policy 
